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Abstract 
While it is relatively easy for most people to identify human beings 
suffering from poverty, it is rather more difficult to come to a proper 
understanding of poverty. In this article the author wants to deepen 
our understanding of poverty by interpreting the conventional 
definitions of poverty in a new light. The article starts with a defence 
of a claim that poverty is a concept uniquely applicable to humans. 
It then present a critical discussion of the distinction between 
absolute and relative poverty and it is then argued that a revision of 




Poverty is arguably the biggest problem facing humans today. In 1995 it was 
said that more than one billion people “live in abject poverty, most of whom go 
hungry every day” (Copenhagen Declaration 1995:6). Poverty is the greatest 
cause of suffering on earth and responsible for more preventable deaths than 
anything else (Gordon 2002:74). We, human beings on earth, have all the 
knowledge and resources we need to eradicate poverty everywhere (UNDP 
1997:iii). Never before has poverty been so high on the agenda of so many 
governments and international bodies. The world has never before witnessed 
so many of heads of state and government publicly commit themselves to 
eradicate poverty. 117 heads of state or government attended the World 
Summit for Social Development in 1995. At that event the “largest gathering 
yet of world leaders pledged to make the conquest of poverty, the goal of full 
employment and the fostering of stable, safe, and just societies their 
overriding objectives” (Copenhagen Declaration 1995:vii). Despite all this, 
poverty still persists as a massive problem affecting hundreds of millions of 
human beings across the globe.  
Most of us can easily identify human beings suffering from poverty, but 
find it slightly more difficult to understand poverty properly. In this essay I 
attempt to deepen our understanding of poverty by interpreting the 
conventional definitions of poverty in a new light. I argue for the general claim 
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that poverty is a concept uniquely applied to a specific human condition. To 
establish this claim, I present the following arguments: 
 
• I first point out that the concept of poverty is applied exclusively to 
human beings in everyday language. 
 
• Next I show that the concept of poverty has a distinctive evaluative 
dimension that depicts this human condition as an undesirable or 
negative state of affairs for humans to be in. 
 
• The third argument first refines the well-known distinction in the human 
sciences between absolute and relative poverty. I then demonstrate 
that the notion of absolute poverty is in need of the definition of relative 
poverty so as to indicate clearly that poverty implies a loss of a 
person’s humanity. 
 
Perhaps some readers want to object at the starting point, arguing that middle 
class academic researchers should not define and identify a condition they 
have no experience or intimate knowledge of. They should rather allow poor 
people to voice their own definition of a condition they suffer publicly and often 
embarrassingly so. Such an objection contains controversial assumptions. 
One assumption borders on solipsism that suggests that one “has to be one to 
know one.” Another assumption is that people experiencing a particular 
condition necessarily have the ability to best describe that condition accurately 
and insightfully. Both these assumptions would invalidate large parts of the 
work of the human sciences.  
Attempts at a “bottoms up” definition of poverty by academics can work 
if done in the following way. In the process of constructing such definitions, 
researchers deliberately select people with special characteristics, i.e. those 
who have experienced severe poverty. Researchers also sometimes consult 
social workers or aid workers thoroughly familiar with more serious cases of 
poverty as informants. Thus, researchers make use of reports by those with 
insider knowledge of poverty, or depictions by professionals with intimate 
expert knowledge of humans living in poverty.  
Researchers then interpret the experiences reported and construct a 
definition from them, transposing poor people’s self-descriptions into the 
typical theoretical constructs employed in the human sciences. Thus, in 
practice this kind of definition rests on the idea that a definition of poverty 
must be developed in dialogue between the discourses of the human sciences 
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and the self reported experiences of those who are poor, or who are in close 
contact with poor people.  
In this way our academic understanding of concepts are developed in 
dialogue with people affected by poverty. The contents of the definition of 
poverty can thus cohere with people’s everyday experiences of the 
phenomena the researchers wish to portray. Furthermore, theoretical 
definitions of concepts like poverty must be tested for the illuminating value 
they have in clarifying the nature of poor people’s experiences. 
 
2. POVERTY AS UNIQUELY HUMAN IN EVERYDAY 
LANGUAGE  
In recent UN Development Reports (1997, 2000), the authors use the term 
“human poverty”. Why add the adjective “human” to the concept of poverty? Is 
it possible that other living beings like plants and animals can also suffer from, 
or live in, poverty? Do we speak of “animal poverty” or “plants suffering 
poverty” in everyday language? Let us test this proposal by means of an 
example. Imagine an elephant in a small zoo. The zoo has inadequate 
financial resources. The elephant is cramped in a smallish cage with no trees, 
shrubs, or grass. No other elephants are in sight. For more than three years 
the elephant has not had enough food and water. As a result the animal is in a 
bad physical condition, easily susceptible to disease and has many sores on 
its body. The elephant also seems psychologically depressed, communicating 
its negative emotional state by means of enfeebled body language and 
mournful sounds. 
Anyone seeing the elephant in this state realizes that it might soon die. 
The condition and circumstances of the elephant roughly correspond with 
those of a human being suffering from severe poverty. The elephant might be 
judged to be suffering from neglect and cruelty, but would we describe the 
elephant as poor, or suffering from poverty? The concepts poor and poverty 
are not usually applied in this way when talking of an animal, except when we 
exclaim in a pitiful voice, “Oh, poor elephant!” In this case we use “poor” 
metaphorically to express the bad condition and pitiful state of the animal.  
In contrast to our description of the elephant, in the case of a human 
being without the minimum necessaries to sustain physical health we describe 
the person as suffering from absolute poverty. This implies that human beings 
in whichever part of the world are judged poor if they do not have adequate 
economic capacities to ensure access to food, shelter, clothing, security, and 
medical care needed to maintain their physical health. Why then do we 
distinguish in this way, calling humans poor but not elephants?  
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One might suggest the crucial difference is the relationships the 
elephant and human have to other human beings. The elephant is being 
enslaved and imprisoned in a cage by a member of a more powerful species 
that is not taking proper care of the animal. The human does not have such a 
relationship of enslavement or imprisonment with other humans and thus 
could be described as free to autonomously determine his or her own life.  
However, the example might be misleading if read in this way. Suppose 
we find this elephant in a similar emaciated condition where it roams freely, 
without restrictions imposed by humans, on the African savannah during a 
massive drought. Again, I am sure we will not describe the elephant as living 
in poverty, or suffering from it. We might say the elephant suffers as a result of 
drought, or that the elephant is a victim of a natural disaster. When we 
exclaim, “Poor creature!” we are not describing its situation in terms of 
poverty, but using the word “poor” metaphorically to express our compassion 
with its suffering.  
Thus, in our everyday use of language poverty is a concept uniquely 
applied to humans. If this is true, does the concept of poverty express 
something particularly important about what it means to be human? 
 
3. POVERTY AS EVALUATIVE CONCEPT 
Perhaps another feature of the concept of poverty can get us closer to unravel 
the meaning of poverty as concept uniquely applied to humans. Poverty is not 
only used as a descriptive concept, that is to describe a certain human 
condition, but also in a prescriptive way to comment on, or evaluate, human 
lives. Pete Alcock (1993:6) defends the view that the concept of poverty also 
contains an implicit imperative to act to relieve or eradicate someone’s 
poverty, besides its descriptive function. Jo Roll claims (1992:7, 8) that 
poverty denotes “a kind of avoidable suffering” that implies onlookers “cannot 
just stand by and watch; they must take action.” I suspect Alcock and Roll are 
onto something important, but overstate their point. If they are correct that the 
concept of poverty implies that non-poor people must do something about the 
effects of poverty on people, the world would perhaps have had less poor 
people on all continents. Would people not have heeded the implicit call to 
action in the word they use to describe the misery and hardship of so many 
fellow human beings?  
Alcock and Roll may be correct, though, if we weaken their claim to that 
of saying that the concept of poverty has an evaluative component. Perhaps 
the judgement by Gordon, Pantazis and Townsend (2000:91), that poverty is 
not only a scientific concept, but also a “moral concept” is closer to the truth. 
Srinivasan’s (1994:241), remark that “Hardly anyone would choose to be 
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poor” neatly illustrates this evaluative component in the concept of poverty 
that is that poverty is an undesirable and negative state of affairs few people 
would choose out of their own volition.  
The claim that the concept of poverty has an evaluative aspect can be 
unpacked and defended as follows. When describing a human being as living 
in poverty, we normatively evaluate that person’s life and judge it to be 
unworthy of how humans ought to live. To live in poverty, or to suffer poverty, 
exposes the victim to a lifestyle judged to be below the minimum standard 
appropriate to humans. Thus, to describe someone as poor is the result of a 
normative judgment that a specific human being has inadequate economic 
capacities available to live a life that conforms to the minimum standards a 
group of humans have implicitly agreed upon as minimally adequate for 
themselves. This idea squares better with one of Alcock’s remarks (1993:9) 
that people living in poverty “by definition” find themselves in “an undesirable 
or negative situation (unacceptable state of affairs).” 
Let us test this idea by means of an example. Suppose Smith is an 
environmental activist. He wants to stage a personal protest against the 
consumerist lifestyle in First World countries that he thinks is responsible for 
the consumption of energy resources that causes global warming. Instead of 
building a house like everyone else, he digs an underground chamber for his 
family to live in, without using any conventional building materials or 
household appliances. The soil in his chosen location is stable enough not to 
pose any threat of collapsing. He decorates the interior with natural materials 
that he removes from nature without doing any visible harm. Smith does not 
use any source of energy that contributes to an increase in greenhouse 
gases. He thus relies on a few simple candles for lighting and chooses 
devices for cooking that utilize solar power. No indoor heating is needed, as 
the temperature below ground is stable at normal room temperature. The 
family cultivates most of their food in a small garden and they own only a few 
items of necessary clothing. Through this lifestyle they want to demonstrate to 
others how small the ecological footprint of a human family can be. 
The family’s standards of personal hygiene are lower than the rest of 
society due to their minimal use of water, consumer products and household 
appliances. Their clothing appears rather dirty and neglected for similar 
reasons. Their physical health is good, as their garden produces an adequate 
supply of nutritious food. Smith earns a lot of money in his job as accountant, 
which he mostly donates to environmental activist groups. Smith and his 
family are judged by their community as weird and wacky. They are shunned 
by many as a result of their appearance, hygiene, and unconventional 
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lifestyle. They do not have any close friends whom they entertain in their 
underground chamber.  
Are Smith and his family poor? We could hardly call them poor if they 
have chosen this lifestyle and have enough economic capacities to live a 
perfectly “normal” life. Although the family cannot be called poor, they do 
violate our sense of what constitutes “normal human living” in current society. 
They do not comply with the standards of living judged to be appropriate for 
humans in our society. In contrast, if McArthur were to follow exactly the same 
lifestyle as Smith with the exception that both she and her partner are 
unemployed with no income, their family would surely be described as poor. 
McArthur and her family simply do not have the economic capacities to 
choose any other lifestyle. Jenkins is a different case, though. Jenkins lives 
exactly as Smith does, or more accurately, 5,000 years ago he lived exactly 
as Smith does now. Jenkins, one of the leaders in his tribe, was very proud of 
his underground chamber with separate rooms for every family member. His 
enormous physical strength and endurance enabled him to build a house 
underground envied by others in the village. His use of beautiful stones 
collected from the top of the mountain and tree trunks dragged from the 
dangerous forest was regarded as innovative decorations.  
Although long ago Jenkins lived exactly the same life as McArthur now, 
Jenkins cannot be judged to have been poor. McArthur, though, is poor. In 
terms of his society’s standards of what constitutes an appropriate lifestyle for 
human beings, Jenkins excelled. The society in which McArthur lives gives a 
different, more demanding, content to the standards of what constitutes a 
minimally acceptable, appropriate lifestyle for human beings. McArthur fails to 
live up to these more demanding standards due to her poverty, her lack of 
economic capacities. Smith, though, is a different case. He rejects these 
societal standards as inappropriate to adopt as lifestyle for so many humans 
on a fragile planet with limited resources. Smith is not poor, as he has freely 
chosen to live according to different standards. Despite having more than 
enough economic capacities to fulfil societal requirements, his project is to 
challenge the standards his society uses to determine poverty levels. By doing 
this, he wants to lower consumption patterns in favour of safeguarding the 
earth’s fragile resources. 
The example can be explored further to bring out the idea that every 
society has standards for what is regarded as suitable styles of human living 
made possible through the use of economic capacities and exchange of 
resources. Suppose Thompson is too poor to afford accommodation. The best 
he can do is to sleep in an old dilapidated pigsty at the farm where he works. 
He has nowhere to hang his clothes, no bathroom or kitchen, and feels too 
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embarrassed to invite any friends or family to visit. In most human societies 
his “home” would be considered unfit for human habitation. Imagine 
Thompson explores the farm and finds a cave used by thousands of bats. He 
decides the cave provides better accommodation, as it is bigger and has more 
privacy from prying human eyes. He meets an old acquaintance, Thomas, in 
town and blurts out that he lives in a cave. Thomas is unfamiliar with 
Thompson’s present circumstances, but remembers Thompson as an 
adventurer from school days. Thomas eagerly wants to visit the cave, while 
Thompson is too embarrassed to stop him. At the cave Thomas learns that 
Thompson is not an exploring researcher observing fascinating animal 
behaviour, but someone too poor to afford better living conditions. Will 
Thomas still be excited about Thompson’s chosen abode/dwelling? Having 
taken in the full situation, will Thomas reckon that his old acquaintance, or any 
human being for that matter, should live like that? 
What is appropriate accommodation for humans at a particular time 
and place? To judge that involves the following. The kind of shelter fit for 
human use depends on the materials, skills, and technologies available to 
people in a society, combined with the climate and the particular purposes for 
which they use housing. Almost all other living beings can be ‘left outside’ to 
find shelter for themselves if they wish, but we judge members of our species 
differently. We expect fellow humans to have access to housing adequate 
enough to shelter them against the elements, to provide adequate space for 
everyone living there, to serve as workshop for household activities, and 
provide privacy for those activities judged to be of concern to individual 
household members only.  
Obviously the exact ways different societies have set their standards 
have varied enormously through history and culture. But nevertheless, it 
seems as if every society has some kind of determinate standards for 
appropriate accommodation. Igloos, tents, huts, caves, paper-houses, 
mansions, flats – whatever materials, technologies, skills, or functional ideas 
were combined, the use of these things were judged to provide the kind of 
shelter needed by members of our species in the particular circumstances of a 
specific society. Human beings without the defined minimum standard would 
have been assisted to find something appropriate, unless they were 
considered to be outside the human community. Those humans who are 
ostracized or marginalized for whatever reason – as poor people often are – 
are left to their own devices.  
 
4. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE POVERTY 
I have thus far argued that (1) the concept of poverty is only applied to 
humans in everyday language and (2) poverty is an evaluative concept used 
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by human societies to set minimum standards for those aspects of human 
lifestyles acquirable through economic capacities. Such lifestyles are judged 
appropriate for human beings, or not, in the context of the society’s available 
knowledge, ideas, resources, and circumstances. Every society has standards 
for human lifestyles that determine whether a lifestyle is considered worthy of 
human beings or not. If a human being cannot acquire a worthy lifestyle due 
to lack of adequate economic capacities, we judge that person to be poor. 
What is the link between this definition of poverty as distinctively 
human and the traditional distinction human scientists make between absolute 
and relative poverty? How have social scientists used the concepts of 
absolute and relative poverty? Can the use of these concepts be improved by 
the argument that the concept of poverty signals a standard of living that is 
below what is judged to be appropriately human in a specific society? In the 
next section I will argue for revised definitions of the concepts of absolute and 
relative poverty, based on the idea that it is significant that we apply the 
concept poverty only to a certain condition suffered by humans. I will show 
that the concept of absolute poverty portrays a particularly severe condition 
suffered by humans. I will also argue that the concept of relative poverty 
illustrates why poverty is a condition that violates the worth and dignity of 
human beings as understood in a particular society.  
 
5. ABSOLUTE POVERTY  
In his groundbreaking research, B Seebohm Rowntree (1901) gave a 
definition of poverty that went unchallenged for almost half a century. This 
definition requires critical scrutiny, as slightly modified versions persist in 
contemporary use of the idea of absolute poverty. After discussing the most 
influential definitions, I will defend a revised definition of absolute poverty.  
Rowntree takes families as unit of investigation. He defines families as 
poor if their income, total earnings, or “minimum necessary expenditure” 
cannot obtain or provide “the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of 
merely physical efficiency” for a family of their size (Rowntree 1901:viii, 87). 
He explains this idea as “the minimum of food, clothing, and shelter needful 
for the maintenance of mere physical health” (Rowntree 1901:87).  
The income needed for the minimum necessaries will vary with both 
the size of a family, as well as with the food required “by the severity of their 
work” (Rowntree 1901:97). Acknowledging these variations, Rowntree 
investigates which kinds of foods and how much thereof would be adequate to 
maintain physical health (Rowntree 1901:viii). He also notes what workers 
would have to pay for these foods (Rowntree 1901:103). Thus, what might 
initially have seemed to be an inflexible universal standard applicable to every 
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family in an identical way, Rowntree adapts to a standard tailored to the size 
of the families and the markets they have access to. 
Rowntree’s slight softening of the application of his austere minimum 
standard for determining poverty is undone by some of his other assumptions. 
He applies the standard on the strong assumption that poor families have 
good knowledge of the most nutritious foods and where to buy at the best 
prices. He makes this assumption to guide his research despite the fact that 
he knew they did not have that kind of knowledge (Rowntree 1901:105). He 
furthermore assumed that poor families used all their available earnings for 
purposes of maintaining “merely physical efficiency” (Rowntree 1901:viii). If 
people had adequate income to afford the minimum necessaries for 
maintenance of physical health, but could not do so as a result of using part of 
their available income for other purposes, Rowntree described them as 
suffering from secondary poverty (Rowntree 1901: viii). These people are poor 
because part of their earnings was “absorbed by other expenditure, either 
useful or wasteful” (Rowntree 1901:viii). 
Rowntree defines primary poverty as a condition that occurs when a 
family’s full income, combined with sophisticated consumer skills, cannot 
enable them to provide for a family of their size and with their levels of activity 
the minimum food, shelter, and clothing to be physically healthy. The strength 
of this definition is the provision of a threshold below which poor people’s 
bodies will begin to suffer ill health of some or other kind. Despite the flaws in 
his attempted expert judgement to work out the details of an adequate diet 
and the over-optimistic assumptions about the skills and knowledge of poor 
consumers, Rowntree’s definition provides a basis for the idea of absolute 
poverty that is generally accepted today. It might be difficult to spell out the 
exact nutritional requirements for each person with their bodily activities and 
to determine the cost of such an adequate diet in different localities, regions, 
countries, and continents (Streeter 1994:234). Nevertheless, it stands to 
reason that people without adequate food, shelter, and clothing will suffer 
some or other form of bodily harm, even if only loss of weight and increased 
susceptibility to disease.  
Rowntree’s definition lives on in modified and adapted versions that 
now define absolute poverty. All these versions assume that human beings 
require similar things to maintain their physical health, such as a basic 
minimum of nutritious food, shelter to protect against the elements, proper 
clothing for diverse climatic conditions, security, and medical care. Although 
the nature and cost of these provisions differ from society to society, a 
baseline applicable to all humans can be set: a person is absolutely poor if 
you do not have sufficient economic capacities to ward off a decline in 
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physical health. The decline can be determined through various measuring 
instruments: loss of weight due to lack of enough food, weight gain as result of 
lack of resources to procure food providing adequate nutrition, increased 
susceptibility to disease, et cetera (Tarp et al 2002). 
Note the use of the concept economic capacities instead of economic 
resources. Rowntree assumed that poor people would be streetwise 
consumers able to buy valuable products in the most economical way, 
knowing that few of them can in fact do so. He never examined or studied the 
abilities of poor people to deal with resources wisely, or not. Although his 
assumption is too stringent a requirement to expect most consumers to fulfil, 
let alone only the poor ones, Rowntree’s assumption touches on an important 
issue. He did not take sufficient account of the fact that different people 
usually do not display the same skills in using economic resources. To 
acknowledge this variable human characteristic thus makes the concept 
economic capacities far more acceptable for use in a definition of poverty than 
the notion of only economic resources. Amartya Sen (1984) alerted us to the 
importance of our “conversion capacity,” that is, our capacities to utilize 
resources efficiently or not. Sen’s convincing argument about this issue thus 
makes the use of the idea of economic capacities to refer both to resources as 
well the ability to utilize resources “to provide adequately for themselves” 
(Alcock 1993:61) more attractive. Using capacities instead of resources can 
avoid embodying an assumption in the definition of absolute poverty that 
ordinary consumers possess skills of smart economizing on scarce and 
valuable resources. If we include capacities in the definition of poverty we can 
make reasonable allowance for the small failings and non-malicious wastage 
that ordinary people frequently incur in their daily consumer activities. 
In his classical study of pauperism, Charles Booth (1892) exemplifies 
the kind of generous and humane attitude toward poor people that I want to 
endorse in the process of determining the absolute poverty line. Note how he 
identifies with the very human shortcomings and failings of poor people whom 
he has studied: 
 
… they, like all of us, are nothing much to boast of morally, and are 
far from wise. They quarrel with their bread and butter; they throw 
away their chances; they spend when they should save; they most 
of them drink, and many of them get drunk; they marry imprudently; 
they spoil their children; they buy finery; they borrow money and 
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Booth assumes that in these matters poor people are “like all of us.” We all 
have such human failings in our consumer behaviour. Many non-poor people 
waste resources and do stupid things with their money, but they are shielded 
from slipping into poverty by their adequate share of economic resources. If 
their share of economic resources were close to the poverty line, they would 
have been poor as well. 
Not all contemporary definitions of absolute poverty are sufficiently 
precise. Take, for example, the definition adopted in The Copenhagen 
Declaration and Programme of Action (1995:57). Absolute poverty is 
formulated as “a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human 
needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access 
to social services.” Although many people have an intuitive understanding of 
what the definition wants to convey, it is difficult to figure out what exactly 
“severe deprivation of basic human needs” means or to determine when 
precisely someone reaches that point. To operationalize this idea with the aim 
of developing a measurable baseline or poverty line can be very difficult, even 
granted that any attempt at ranking people in this way “will always contain a 
measurement error and, if a poverty line is used, there will always be a 
number of misclassified individuals” (Halleröd 2000:171). The definition used 
by the World Bank is hardly more precise. This definition says that poverty is 
“the inability to attain a minimal standard of living, interpreted to include not 
only consumption of food, clothing, and shelter, but also access to education, 
health services, clean water, and so on” (Squire 1993:377; World Bank 
1990:26). What exactly does “minimal standard of living,” in the World Bank 
definition mentioned above, imply for each of the categories mentioned, when 
applied to specific societies? The meaning is not clear at all. 
I want to claim that the alternative definition of absolute poverty I 
propose is more precise and better able to be operationalized into a baseline. 
We can measure gradual deterioration of physical health in human beings in 
various ways through different measuring instruments by studying things such 
as intake of nutritious foods, weight loss, stunted growth, etc.  
Alcock (1993:58) raises an objection to a definition of absolute poverty 
that implies a sufferer “does not have enough to live on.” He judges this 
formulation “a contradiction in terms” and asks the rhetorical question: “… how 
do those without enough to live on, live?” Alcock exploits an imprecise 
formulation about serious human misery. His rhetorical question fades if 
confronted with my more precise definition given above. Thus, people without 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, security, and medical care suffer at least a 
gradual, if not sudden, decline in physical health. People living in absolute 
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poverty can stay alive for a long time whilst their physical condition and health 
continue to deteriorate. At some point their living in absolute poverty meshes 
into destitution, a condition characterized by extreme hardship and miserable 
desperation (see Dasgupta 1992). Scenes of emaciated human beings barely 
alive in their destitution are common in some parts of the world. To see 
human beings in this condition usually shock and overwhelm human 
observers.  
Although the definition of absolute poverty provides a universally 
applicable baseline of poverty, I want to claim that using only this baseline as 
measure of poverty strips human beings of their humanity (see Jones 1990). 
This baseline implicitly assumes that poor people just above it, with economic 
capacities that just enable them to maintain physical health, are living lives 
compatible with their status as human beings. Is it a life befitting the status of 
human beings to be only able to avoid a deterioration of physical health, but 
not to be able to engage in social activities? The baseline implies that as 
humans these people need not be participants in the social life of a 
community, need no educational empowerment, requires no recreational 
entertainment, nor do they have any personal or communal events to 
celebrate with others. To live a life excluded from generally accepted social 
activities that normal human communities engage in is to live a subhuman life, 
i.e. a life in which core activities typical of the human species are impossible 
to do. In addition to the misery of struggling with insufficient economic 
capacities, people just above the absolute poverty line suffer the humiliation of 
being incapable of living lives judged as fulfilling their society’s minimal 
requirements to qualify as human. 
 
6. RELATIVE POVERTY  
The shortcomings in Rowntree’s definition identified above lead us to the 
alternative and wider definition of poverty. How? One shortcoming of 
Rowntree’s definition emerges from the following question. Can we really 
judge people as “not poor” if they only have the minimum food, clothing, and 
shelter to protect their physical health? If all the family’s earnings can just 
cover their expenses for these minimum necessaries, they still have no 
transport, they cannot buy gifts for special occasions like birthdays and 
Christmas, have no access to any entertainment that cost money, cannot 
invite friends for tea or dinner, and so on. Furthermore, they are required to 
show much self-discipline in their consumption so as never to buy 
newspapers, magazines, sweets, or anything else that does not secure 
physical health. They cannot entertain friends, go to shows, or be spectators 
at sports events. To have one’s freedoms curtailed in such a way and to 
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display such frugality can be very demanding. Not able to participate in normal 
social activities and practices of one’s society means Rowntree’s non-poor 
people become excluded as participants in the generally accepted activities of 
a normal society. Peter Townsend (1954, 1979) formulated these objections 
and the major alternative definition of poverty to address the shortcomings of 
Rowntree’s definition.  
Thus far I have argued that the strict absolutist definitions of poverty 
with their exclusive focus on the minimum requirements for mere physical 
survival and maintenance of physical health can be perceived as inhuman if 
presented as the only definition of poverty. The absolute definition is useful for 
setting a baseline for a particularly severe kind of poverty, but needs to be 
supplemented by a second kind of definition. There is surely more to human 
life than mere physical survival and health? For this reason I will next explore 
the wider definition of poverty proposed by human scientists who classify 
people as poor if they cannot participate in the social activities of their 
community. This definition of relative poverty clearly shows why being poor is 
inhuman and thus why the concept of poverty functions to indicate a specific 
kind of loss to a person’s human dignity. 
In response to Rowntree’s influential research, Townsend (1954, 1979) 
formulates an alternative, wider definition of poverty. He develops his 
definition as response to Rowntree’s definition. Townsend (1954:132) judges 
the standards set by Rowntree as not related well enough to the “budgets and 
customs of life of working people.” He also disagrees with the austere ways in 
which Rowntree proposed poor people ought to have spent their money. 
Townsend (1954:133) accuses researchers like Rowntree of expecting poor 
people to act “like skilled dieticians with marked tendencies towards 
puritanism” in their choice of food products. To spend their money according 
to such expectations, poor people would need “virtues of self-denial, skill and 
knowledge not possessed by any other class of society” (Townsend 
1954:133). Townsend therefore formulates a broader definition of poverty. His 
definition of relative poverty takes as starting point the idea that poverty must 
be understood relative to “the accepted modes of behaviour in the 
communities in which they live,” as these are influenced “by the practices 
adopted by the society as a whole” (Townsend 1954:134). 
Townsend (1979:31) defines relative poverty as follows: “Individuals, 
families, and groups in the population … lack the resources to obtain the 
types of diet, participate in the activities, and have the living conditions and 
amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged and 
approved, in the societies to which they belong.” When people’s command of 
resources slips so low, Townsend (1979:31) maintains, “they are, in effect, 
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excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities”. A relative 
definition of poverty judges that people are poor if they do not have sufficient 
resources to participate in the style of life of the communities of which they 
form part (see Townsend 1979:54-88). If people do not have the resources to 
share, or participate, in the “customs, activities and diets” commonly approved 
by their society and embodied in its style of living, they are classified as being 
poor (Townsend 1979:60, 88).  
This definition has two attractive features. One is the focus on how 
poverty, as lack of economic capacities, can have the consequence that poor 
people cannot participate in the activities of their broader social context. Their 
poverty thus leads to social exclusion. Another attractive feature is the way 
that poverty is defined relative to the standard of living within a specific 
society. Poverty in a hunter-gatherer society must be understood and 
measured differently from poverty in a modern, industrial democracy. These 
two attractive features of Townsend’s definition also contain two weaknesses. 
One weakness is Townsend’s woolly description of what comprises social 
participation. Can we define a non-arbitrary list of social activities as part of 
the society’s standard of human living that people ought to participate in? 
Townsend uses words like “types of custom and social activity,” “diets,” and 
“home, environmental and work conditions” to closer delineate what styles of 
living involve. These words depict a rather comprehensive set of human 
activities that most people only partially engage in. Is it possible to narrow 
down the general abstract requirement of social participation?   
Although a lot of important research has been done on poverty since 
Townsend formulated his views on relative poverty, no one has convincingly 
addressed the issues raised above. The milestone event of 117 heads of state 
or government who met in Copenhagen in March 1995, made “the conquest 
of poverty, the goal of full employment and the fostering of stable, safe and 
just societies their overriding objectives,” did not produce a much better 
definition of relative poverty. In addition to their definition of absolute poverty 
discussed above, the Copenhagen Declaration’s definition of overall poverty is 
articulated by Gordon (2000:52) as “not having those things that society thinks 
are basic necessities and, in addition, not being able to do the things that 
most people take for granted”.  This definition is hardly anymore detailed or 
specific than Townsend’s version. The same goes for the Council of Europe’s 
definitions of 1975, as modified by the European Community in 1984: poor 
people are those individuals or families “whose resources (material, cultural, 
or social) are so small as to exclude them from a minimum acceptable way of 
life in the member state in which they live” (quoted by Gordon 2002:58).  
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A second weakness of Townsend’s definition is the correct, but 
incomplete emphasis on the relative nature of this kind of poverty. Can this 
kind of poverty that causes social exclusion only be defined in terms of the 
social conditions of the society to which the individual belongs? Is Halleröd 
(2000:167) correct that what is “deemed as ‘severe deprivation’ will always 
depend on the ordinary lifestyle and way of consumption that prevails in a 
society”? Is it not possible to embody a universal element in this definition, to 
formulate a set of generic social activities that humans throughout the ages 
have engaged in? Will it then be possible to judge a society’s level of poverty 
or riches by determining the spectrum of such activities available and by 
measuring the extent to which its members are enabled to participate? 
Imagine a society where a lack of economic capacities is responsible for the 
particularly narrow spectrum of such activities the society offers and for the 
low level of participation of members in those limited activities. Surely this 
society would qualify as poor in terms of a universal standard applicable to all 
human societies? 
One of the few philosophers who seriously thought about poverty 
comes a lot closer to reconciling a more universal definition of poverty with 
Townsend’s definition of relative poverty. John D Jones acknowledges that 
styles of living are determined by a specific society “within the determinate 
historical situation in which they live” (Jones 1990:67). The crucial move that 
Jones makes is to link this idea of “a mode of life customary in their society” 
with the idea that such a life is one judged by a particular society to be 
“minimally fit and appropriate for people and thus minimally required for an 
appropriate realization of human dignity” (Jones 1990:67). This move by 
Jones gives us access to the possibility of a universal definition of poverty 
applicable to all human societies. Poverty could thus be defined a lack of 
sufficient economic capacities to engage in a set of basic, fundamental human 
social activities that defines what it means to live as a human being in a 
particular place and time (see also John Veit Wilson, in Gordon & Townsend 
2000:158). This definition makes sense of the experience reported by World 
Bank researchers who were struck by both the universality and the specificity 
of people’s experiences with poverty all over the world, “As we moved more 
deeply into analyses of poor people’s experiences with poverty, we were 
struck repeatedly by the paradox of the location and social group specificity of 
poverty, and yet the commonality of the human experience of poverty across 
countries” (Narayan et al 2000:3). 
The possibility now exists for defining a broad, universal set of social 
activities that any particular human community practices in their own culturally 
unique way. I want to claim that most human communities known throughout 
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history would have engaged in the following set of activities in their own 
culturally defined way, if they had sufficient economic capacities to do so. The 
principal activities in human communities are those that secure adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, security and medical care to ensure the survival of the 
group. Most other social activities focus on fostering social co-operation and 
enhancing social solidarity, crucial for survival and prerequisites for 
achievement of a rich and diverse cultural life. Typical activities include 
governance of diverse aspects of the community’s shared life to maintain 
social order, education to train and equip others to fulfil useful tasks, initiation 
ceremonies for welcoming new participants in diverse social practices, 
thanksgiving events for expressing gratitude for services rendered in smaller 
or larger contexts, celebration of significant events on smaller (family) and 
larger (society) scale, and entertainment to amuse and amaze others through 
expressing rare individual and team talents and skills.  
The rationale for this set of human activities is that they seem to 
encapsulate the set of activities human communities have engaged in 
throughout known history. Engaging in a configuration of such activities 
expresses our humanity. Put differently, to qualify as human, communities 
should be economically able to enact their versions of such activities. Any 
normally functioning human community ought to have the economic capacities 
to generate and sustain their own interpretation and expression of such 
activities practiced by all human beings throughout history in their own 
distinctive ways. If this is true, we have a universal, albeit an approximate, 
standard to determine the level of poverty or riches of a particular society.  
Let us explore this idea. Society X has been poor for many decades 
and in addition has suffered severe droughts over the past few years. 
Agriculture is the main source of income. Although they share their minimal 
resources with one another, many have died as a result of not having enough 
food to eat. Virtually all of them are living in absolute poverty. They do not 
have resources to feed themselves properly, let alone any reserves they can 
use for celebrating birthdays, religious festivals, or public holidays. Although 
they can still entertain one another through telling stories, they had to close 
their radio station and cannot afford any theatre productions. Many of them 
are so bogged down by the problems of their society and have so little energy 
as a result of their diets low in nutritious foods that they do not participate in 
such entertainment activities anymore. On visiting such a community, people 
from non-poor countries would typically exclaim: “This is not the way humans 
should live!”  
Society X is similar to many known societies throughout the world. 
Such societies are poor as a whole, because they do not have the economic 
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capacities to set up, run, and maintain the most basic social activities one 
expects to find in any human society. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this essay I have developed the following ideas. 
 
• Poverty is a concept uniquely applied to humans to indicate when a 
specific person has fallen below the standard of life thought appropriate 
for someone in that culture. 
 
• Absolute poverty means that a person does not have adequate 
economic capacities to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, 
security, and medical care to maintain their physical health. 
 
• Relative poverty means that although people have adequate economic 
capacities to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, security, and 
medical care to maintain their physical health, they cannot participate in 
any other activities regarded as indicative of being human in that 
society. 
 
To be poor thus means to suffer as a result of all the consequences of not 
having enough economic capacities. Poor people experience the humiliation 
of not being able to live fully human lives as specified by their society. Poverty 
entails the desolation of realizing that others do not care that you experience 
poverty in all its fullness, while they furthermore deny any responsibility in the 
genesis of your situation, as well as shirk their responsibility for improving 
your lot. Many morally sensitive people experience moral outrage that humans 
are allowed to suffer such deplorable conditions. Others are reluctant to 
acknowledge the full impact of poverty on fellow human beings and they avoid 
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